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FROM AESTHETICS TO ETHICS: 





An exploration of the role of pleasure or delight (le樂) in classical Confucian 
ethics. Building on Michael Nylan’s account of the role of pleasure in public 
spectacle and social order, I explore how the meaning of delight (le樂) derives 
from the features and effects of music (yue樂). Drawing on Dewey’s aesthetics 
and accounts of music in Confucian texts, I explore a conception of Confucian 




The loving relationship with wife and children, 
Is like the strumming of the zither and the lute; 
In the harmonious relationship between older and younger brothers 
There is an abundance of enjoyment and pleasure. 
Be appropriate in your house and home 
And bring joy to your wife and progeny. 






This paper explores the relationship between the ethical and the aesthetic, through a discussion 
of the role of delight in early Confucian thought. It explores how a conception of ethical conduct 
can be derived from the elevated interest in music and delight-like states found in the early texts.  
This approach is motivated by several considerations. It builds on Henry Rosemont’s 
insight that the cluster of concepts in these texts pertaining to ethical or practical matters is 
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markedly different from those in conventional Anglophone ethics. The latter treats as 
foundational ideas such as “freedom” “objective/subjective” “rights” “reason” and “dilemma”;1 
these are conspicuously absent in the foundational Confucian text, the Analects《論語》 . 
Discourse about personal conduct in this and other early Confucian texts draws on different 
conceptual, including terms such as humaneness (ren仁), ritual (li禮) and appropriateness (yi義). 
Some scholars have woven these concepts together into, for example, a version of virtue ethics 
or, in the case of Rosemont and Roger Ames, a theoretical framework that is putatively 
idiosyncratic to the early Confucians—role ethics.2 In the same spirit of ethical theorizing, I wish 
to explore a further conception of good action, based on the aesthetic discourse and aesthetic 
sensibility so prominent in the Analects. This is one conception of ethics, among several, that 
appears in rudimentary form in the texts. Exploring it will advance debate—both within and 
beyond classical Confucian thought—about what can or should be recognized as ethical action.3 
At the same time, familiar ideas such as exemplary person (junzi君子), potency or charisma (de德) 
and humaneness (ren仁) are provided with alternative interpretations.  
This approach is consistent with historical claims that the classical Confucian tradition is 
an aesthetic tradition. Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1904-1982), for example, noted that, historically, 
aesthetic vocabulary applied in the realms of music, art, and painting evolved into descriptions of 
the characteristics of outstanding men. 4  Others have emphasized the aesthetic qualities that 
characterize the Chinese humanistic tradition as a whole. Zong Baihua宗白華 (1897-1986) 
developed “shengming meixue生命美學” or “life aesthetics,” which emphasized an aesthetic 
attitude towards life and the cosmos.5 Similarly, Li Zehou 李澤厚 (b.1930) narrates the evolution 
of a tradition that recognizes beauty as the highest value.6 Deriving a conception of ethics from 
aesthetics extends this intellectual lineage.7 The pursuit of aesthetic goods as an ethical goal or 
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aim of conduct, and the Confucian interest in musicality, are thus rooted in a socio-cultural 
tradition, a form of life. As discussed below, this includes large-scale public ceremony, and the 
personal attachments of clan-based hierarchical societies.8 In turn, the enjoyment of aesthetic 
goods justifies the demandingness of ritual and social roles—the costs of compliance being 
offset by their instrumental role in generating shared delight. As the traditional view states, ritual 
compels while music rewards.9 
A third motivation for this approach is that early Confucian discourse about delight (le樂) 
can be enriched by utilizing John Dewey’s conception of the aesthetic, developed in Art as 
Experience. Aesthetics is often treated as an investigation of the way in which things appear to 
the senses. But Dewey focuses not only on sensations but also on the structure and qualities that 
characterize conscious experience. Dewey distinguishes between two kinds of experience: “mere 
experience” and “an experience.”10 Mere experience is “inchoate” and fragmented, subject to 
“distraction and dispersal,” with attention scattered and focus minimal. In contrast, “an 
experience” describes those episodes of experience that are qualitatively different from mere 
experience; they are meaningful, self-contained and unified. These elevated or qualitatively 
distinct experiences are characterized by aesthetic qualities such as harmony, intensity, 
satisfaction, rhythm, completeness, and consummation.11 These qualities permeate experience, 
and are also their own reward; they constitute delight. The achievement of such qualitatively 
distinguished experiences can function as a meaningful aim of conduct.  
Dewey’s account of aesthetic experience explains the extensive Confucian interest in 
delight. Specifically, Deweyan theory explains the conceptual overlap between delight and music 
in early Confucian thought: the ideal qualities or “delightful” experiences associated with music 
are similar to the qualities Dewey equates with qualitative higher experience: completeness, 
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unity, ease, flow and so on. This conceptual pathway suggests that the creation of such delight 
can be a guiding ideal for conduct, an ethics. Such delight—characterized as the quality of 
experience attained among participants through social engagement—is an end at which 
Confucian practice aims.12 In the conclusion, I offer a few thoughts on how this conception of 
the good life might offer an alternative to the dominant model of liberal individualism, with its 
emphasis on the prudent realization of substantial private life goals.  
In his recent book, Peimin Ni argued that in the Analects, the aesthetic is as important as 
the moral, and that the aesthetically pleasing becomes the morally commanding. 13  Here, 
“aesthetic” means that the good life is an artistic life, characterized by praxis and intuitive 
judgment. While sympathetic to Ni’s general position, here I focus narrowly on how the aesthetic 
discourse in early Confucian thought can direct practical conduct and social interaction. I focus 
mainly on the character 樂 (le pleasure/delight, yue music) and treat this as an umbrella term for a 
cluster of aesthetic qualities with practical implications. While “pleasure” and “delight” overlap, 
I distinguish between them, with delight indicating a more complex psychological state or 
experience.14 In what follows, I use “delight-like states” to capture the complex nature of such 
delight, as a range of related feelings or experiences and, unlike crude pleasure, not a single 
feeling or phenomenological experience. The composite qualities or experiences might include: a 
sense of ease, a feeling of accord, consummation, rhythm, and so on.  Distinguishing between 
them (i.e., narrowly defining “delight”) is not important since the goal is the more general point 
of how conscious experience can attain a certain satisfying structure or order, which can be 
described in aesthetic terms and treated as an aim of conduct. In the classical Confucian corpus, 
“le 樂” is indicative of such complex and desirable states. Finally, a key context for the creation 
of delight-like states is, I argue, social interaction. In the Analects, it is in the human world—i.e., 
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everyday relations between people—that such meaningful and fulfilling experiences are most 
reliably produced. 
Articulating this connection between delight-like states and good conduct requires several 
steps. First, to show the importance of pleasure/delight to good conduct and the good life; second, 
how personal cultivation and the idealized qualities of the junzi can be characterized as aesthetic, 
and instrumental to the creation of delight; and third, developing the second point, how the 
creation of delight-like states is analogous to the production and effects of music and musical 
harmony. Collectively, these suggest that delight-like states arise in the social world through the 
skilled coordination, much like musicians combine the elements of music to generate the 
aesthetic goods of music. 
II. PLEASURE AND DELIGHT IN 
CLASSICAL CONFUCIAN THOUGHT 
The importance of “le 樂” in the early Confucian texts can be shown in at least two ways: 
through a textual study of the character, and through a social or ethical theory in which le is 
central. Consider the first of these. Confucian ethical discourse is often associated with human 
nature. Yet the Analects has far less to say about human nature than music and delight. In fact, 
the prevalence of terms in classical texts relating to delight-like states is striking. This includes: 
to love/cherish (ai愛), to savor (xiang饗), happiness (kuai快), liking (huan歡), to be fond of 
(hao好), contentment (an安) and ease (yi逸). In the earliest lexicon, the Erya《爾雅》, the 
first chapter provides a gloss on “樂 le/yao”: 
Pleasure or joy (yi怡), to be pleased or glad (yi懌), to delight at (yue悅), happy or 
joyous (xin欣) , to give pleasure (kan衎), to enjoy (xi喜), to be pleased by (yu愉), 
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relaxed or at ease (yu/xu豫), contented or joyful (kai愷), peaceful or happy (kang康), 
pleasure (dan妉) and  delight (ban般): these are delight-like states (le樂).15 
Here is a concept cluster of the kind Rosemont described above, anchored in and contributing 
meaning to the more common term “le 樂”, and collectively described as “delight-like states.”16 
Notably, interest in delight/pleasure is a cross-school phenomenon in the Warring states, and not 
merely Confucian.17 
Delight-like states are not merely prevalent in the texts, however; they are also often 
practically important. They often function as an ideal, a state to be realized or achieved, or a 
necessary condition of power or influence (de德); furthermore, delight often stands at or near the 
top of hierarchies of moral ends or stages of self cultivation. Analects 6:20 formulates such a 
hierarchy, and delight takes priority: “To like something (hao好) is better than to understand it, 
and to delight in it (yao樂) is better than to like it.” Similarly, in the Xunzi 《荀子》the success 
of ritual is construed as: “[All rituals] begins with coarseness, are brought to completion through 
good form, and end with pleasure and satisfaction.” 18  In the Wuxingpian 《五行篇》 also, 
although not one of the five cardinal virtues, delight is repeatedly cited as necessary for potency 
or moral force (de德). For example: 
If a junzi’s inner heart lacks concern (you優) , then it will lack wisdom (zhi智). If it lacks 
wisdom, it will lack joy (yue悅). If it lacks joy, he will not be at ease (an安). Not being at 
ease he will lack delight (le樂) and without delight he will lack potency.19 
The junzi or cultivated person is often characterized as “beautiful” or appealing to others, further 
highlighting the aesthetic qualities that cultivation generates.20 Further textual examples of both 
the prevalence and importance “le 樂” appear below. However, since my primary aim is a 
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speculative reconstruction of the relationship between delight-like states and ethical conduct, I 
focus on the second way of arguing for importance of delight-like states—by locating them 
within social and ethical theory.  
III. NYLAN ON PLEASURE AND GOOD CONDUCT: 
SPECTACLE BRINGS SOCIAL UNITY 
One of few scholars to highlight the importance of delight/pleasure in classical Confucian 
thought is Michael Nylan. She theorizes how “le 樂”—which she translates as pleasure21—
functioned in social theories up to the Han Dynasty.22 Nylan argues that a central concern of the 
time was: “how to convert the consuming pleasures [of rulers]—pleasures that by definition 
required vast expenditures of wealth, time, and physical energy—into sustaining pleasures that 
would support rather than corrupt the state, the family, or the person.”23 Consuming pleasures 
included “massive palaces, terraces, or parks; fine horses and dogs; lovely women;…exquisite 
foods and wines; captivating music; fine rhetoric,” and these were could be summarized as the 
pleasures of “sensual gratification” or “feelings of pride of ownership.”24 Such pleasures could 
be harmful, however. They could diminish individual pleasure in the long term, undermine the 
ruler’s position, and ultimately endanger the state. Sustaining pleasures were preferable, and 
involved the ability to “discern the long-term utility…and value of things, circumstances and 
people.”25 In short, according to Nylan, the classical Confucian thinkers distinguished between 
better and worse kinds of pleasure, and their effects on both ruler and state.  
Nylan also locates the discourse on pleasure within a wider historical context: breakdown 
of the centralized authority of the Zhou dynasty. The key method of securing order and power 
had deteriorated: royal sacrifices in which the sacrificial meats and ceremonial tripods were 
distributed among vassal state rulers. These reproduced personal allegiances to the emperor in 
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material form. The problem arose of how to instill allegiance among vast new populations not 
inclined by hereditary ties or custom to uphold the interests of the central court.26 As traditional 
social structure, in which court ritual reinforced social hierarchy, broke down, new ways to 
generate solidarity and authority were required. This led to “a different model of sociability and 
reward,” in which pleasure was the dominant value.27 Nylan describes the new grounds for 
solidarity and rulership as the emergence of a “display culture”—ceremonies and events in 
which pleasure was shared through the medium of “public spectacle”: 
The intended result was to generate in as many people as possible the distinctly 
pleasurable sense that they shared in the great honor bestowed by the edifying public 
or semi-public spectacle, even when they were excluded from direct participation 
and its tangible rewards, including the distribution of largesse by the ruler, 
community conferrals of honors upon the aged, village banquets, and mourning 
processions. Only such edifying spectacles, it was thought, could in effect grant 
suitably scaled pleasures to people of widely ranging standings and ranks, while 
highlighting the awesome authority accorded the ruler as giver of spectacles.28 
Such spectacle gratified the senses, and the human need for symbolic meaning, status, and 
security.29 Being honored, the thrill of attendance, the pride of membership, and the peace of 
mind in belonging to a powerful state: all are pleasurable. The displays “justified” the lifestyle of 
the ruling elite, while manifesting generosity and fairness towards commoners and consolidating 
the ruler’s authority. Public spectacle thus both satisfied every social strata’s need for pleasure. 
Nylan’s account focuses on one kind of delight-like state: a naturalistic theory of 
pleasure. Here, pleasure originates in naturally occurring desires, aroused through the contact of 
the senses with external objects. Desire is directed as things such as sex, food, material 
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possessions, and military conquest.30 The desire for such pleasures is part of human nature. The 
task, well documented in the Xunzi, is to manage desires that cause unhappiness and conflict, to 
train them. For example, prudence—deferring short-term pleasures for more satisfying pleasures 
in the longer term—becomes important. Similarly, the natural desire for wealth should be 
cultivated so that the wealth pursued benefits the people: the king should share his parks with the 
people.31 
However, pre-Qin Confucian approaches to delight are more varied than Nylan’s account 
recognizes. There are other ways of conceptualizing pleasure or delight, some not reliant on 
desire-based theories. Consider the figure of Yan Hui in the Analects. 
The Master said, “What a worthy man was Yan Hui! Living in a narrow alley, 
subsisting on a basket of grain and gourd full of water—other people could not have 
born such hardship, yet it never spoiled Hui’s joy (le樂). What a worthy man was 
Hui!32  
Delight has little to do with desire here. It indicates the attainment of an ideal state of character 
and mind, aligned with the Confucian way, and no longer emotionally susceptible to material 
hardships. Neo-Confucians such as Cheng Hao read this as someone who accepted all of life’s 
situations with equipoise, without self-centered desires, and who was integrated into the wider 
cosmic order (tian 天).33 In such a state, joy arises in the heart-mind. This is independent of 
natural desires for possessions and status, or the practical goals of the ruler. Indeed, Yong Huang 
argues that the Cheng brothers see such joy as central to moral conduct, “because it is a joy to 
perform moral actions.”34 Here, joy motivates moral conduct by providing this inner reward.35  
Yan Hui’s joy highlights the different Confucian perspectives on delight-like states, and 
their differing relationships to moral conduct. Thus, while Nylan’s account makes clear the 
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importance of delight-like states to early Confucians, her account of pleasure is quite narrow. We 
can consider other sources of delight-like states in the texts, beyond desire, and how these inform 
conceptions of human flourishing and good conduct.  What follows is such an alternative 
account. 
IV. DELIGHT: CREATED BY EXEMPLARY 
PERSONS THROUGH SOCIAL INTERACTION 
This alternative conception builds on Nylan’s insight: that shared social events are integral to the 
generation of delight-like states. In Nylan’s account, participation in public spectacle gives rise 
to pleasure, and so to human flourishing (well-regulated desire) and the good society (social 
cohesion). In the alternative account, the significance of social interaction is understood 
differently; it gives rise to a different kind of delight. Drawing on Dewey’s notion of “an 
experience,” well-coordinated social interaction generates certain kinds of inner experiences 
among participants, characterized by aesthetic properties such as completeness, satisfaction and a 
sense of ease. For example, participants in a ritual act with a sense of purpose, successfully 
complete their intended actions, attain a sense of accomplishment, and enjoy the ceremony as a 
whole. Such experiences or delight-like states have a complexity or composite nature that natural 
desire lacks, and when conscious experience attains such forms or qualities it is intrinsically 
satisfying. Furthermore, such aesthetic goods can also be attributed more broadly, to the shape of 
a life as a whole.36 A life that consists of serial well-ordered, subjectively satisfying social 
interactions—manifested in the accompanying mental or psychological experiences—can be 
considered to have balance, completeness and be well-formed. This is also a kind of human 
flourishing.  
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 Can the early Confucian texts such as the Analects be read as valuing such delight-like 
states?  I believe they can. This is consistent with key Confucian themes, especially the emphasis 
on exemplars and models. In what follows, I argue that the refined sensibility of the cultivated 
person or junzi be understood aesthetically; and one of the tasks of such exemplars is to skilfully 
work with the features and resources present in social interactions to produce delight-like states 
in the experiences of participants. Furthermore, the linkage between “le 樂” and “yue 樂,” or 
delight and music, suggests mechanisms for how such aesthetic experiences are created. 
Coordinating social interaction is similar to the creation of musical harmony. 
4.1   The Social Context: From Formal Ceremony to Everyday Social Life           
The creation of delightful episodes of experience is also rooted in the Confucian faith in a 
shared cultural tradition. This bequeaths a rich social grammar—a common storehouse of 
individual units of social expression, such as words, actions, motifs or objects used selectively in 
varied social situations—which provides much of the material from which such delightful 
experience is crafted. Here, too, we can build on Nylan’s insight. Grand formal ceremony and 
pleasurable spectacle serve as a foundational model for conduct. With the decline of the central 
Zhou authority, however, and the (limited) spread of education, people’s lives outside the royal 
court became more significant. Personal cultivation became a more generalized ethical ideal 
(“the noble man”) and not merely a means of rulership (“the nobleman”). The Analects conveys 
this extension in the readiness to teach anyone sufficiently committed to learning. Along with 
such social change, so the social context or framework within which delight-like states arise 
evolves. Arguably, the focus shifts, from formal ceremony of the Zhou, to more general ritual 
norms and roles, and even to more common social settings and everyday interactions. The 
 12 
realization of delight-like states in these less-scripted interactions (though still often guided by 
some ritual or convention) is a task primarily undertaken by charismatic exemplars. 
This shift in social context can be detected in the texts. The increased focus on everyday 
social affairs (alongside the cosmic dimension) and on affective states therein is highlighted by 
the Doctrine of the Mean 《中庸》: “The Master said: Focusing the familiar affairs of the day is 
a task of the highest order. It is rare among the common people to be able to sustain it for 
long.” 37  Delight is not mentioned here, but it is clear from the opening passage that the 
emotions—including joy (xi喜) and delight (le樂)—are central to conscious action, such that 
bringing them into harmony and “proper focus” enables the exemplary person to successfully 
respond to “the familiar affairs of the day.” Such harmonious balancing in the context of social 
interaction is integral to “the advancing of the proper way in the world.”38 
Delight-like states also become important within family and kinship relations. The 
Classic of Family Reverence《孝經》describes the filial model ruler: “He speaks, having thought 
whether the words should be spoken; he acts, having thought whether his actions are sure to give 
pleasure”39 “In his general conduct to them, he manifests the utmost reverence. In his nourishing 
of them, his endeavor is to give them the utmost pleasure.”40  Although this is a later text 
prescribing behaviour for a ruling elite, the delight sought is distinct from the formal ceremonial 
creation of it. Similarly, sage-king Shun found no delight in “being the object of men's delight, 
with the possession of beauty, riches, and honours.” What was prized was being “in accord with 
his parents” (shunyufumu順於父母).41 Notably, accord (shun順) is also a delight-like state, where a 
sense of accord is a satisfying inner state. 
The idea that social interaction and events are the locus for delight-like states has its roots 
in the Analects《論語》 . In passage 5:26, asked by Zilu what he would most like to do, 
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Confucius focuses on pleasant affective states realized within social relationships, “I would like 
to bring peace and contentment to the aged, to share relationships of trust and confidence with 
my friends, and to love and protect the young.” Contentment (an安) and love or cherishing (huai
懷) are also delight-like states. This focus on personal attachment appears through the Analects, 
but perhaps the most explicit account of how delight is the valued outcome of everyday personal 
attachments is found in Mencius 《孟子》4A27: 
Mengzi said, ‘The most authentic expression (shi實) of humaneness is serving one’s 
parents. The most authentic expression of a sense of justice and appropriateness is 
going along with one’s elder brother. The most authentic expression of wisdom is 
knowing these two things and not abandoning them. The most authentic expression 
of ritual propriety is regulating and civilizing (wen文) these two. The most authentic 
expression of music is taking joy (le樂) in these two. When there is joy, they grow. 
When they grow, how can they be stopped? If they cannot be stopped, then without 
realising, one’s feet begin to step in time to them and one’s hands dance according to 
their rhythms.’42 
Strikingly, the fullest development of filiality and well-ordered family relations gives rise to joy; 
and, as the spontaneous dancing and bodily expressions make clear, it is an intense joy. We 
could read this passage as a simple “jumping for joy,” an outpouring of emotion. But why the 
outpouring? Arguably, the cause is a sense of accord, fittingness, coherence and achievement 
that bring forth such delight. 
4.2   Personal Cultivation as Aesthetic Cultivation 
If the achievement of delight-like states in everyday social and familial contexts is a goal 
of conduct, then we might expect an account of personal cultivation that is aesthetic in nature, 
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directed towards to such experiences. Indeed, we find such an account in the Analects: “Be 
awakened by poetry, be established by ritual, be perfected in music.”43  Completion of this 
process enabled Confucius at seventy to “follow the heart’s desires without overstepping the 
boundaries.”44 We can read each of the three ‘steps’ as a stage of aesthetic cultivation. These are, 
of course, ways of transforming the subject; but they also become means by which the subject 
transforms the social world and the experiences of others. 
“Be awakened by poetry” refers to mastering language and all kinds of literary forms.45 
This ensures a more sophisticated conceptual grasp of the world around and explains why 
Confucius’ advocated reading the Songs《詩經》. Furthermore, the ideas acquired through 
poetry belonged to a shared literary tradition. The ideas of the classical texts and the history of 
the ancients are not merely descriptive or objective; they are imbued with shared attitudes and 
values. A learned person can leverage the emotive power of these shared images and motifs to 
evoke experiences in others. 
“Be established by ritual” expresses the training of character and internalizing of social 
norms, as when certain conduct towards parents become habit. Ritual, however, also involves 
practical mastery: learning to appropriately manipulate objects, including people, by 
understanding relevant particulars and applicable laws or norms. This includes the six arts and 
practical disciplines such as charioteering and archery, as well as agriculture; but ritual is also a 
means to being practically effective in the social world. Ritual stimulates awareness of social 
context, including people in the surrounding environment, and empowers the subject to direct 
objects or events within that context—to skillfully maintain relations with others, avoid 
resentment (yuan怨), use material objects to generate delight (e.g., gift giving), and so on. Ritual 
is also immediately aesthetically pleasing to others. It creates graceful bodies, while manners and 
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tact evoke high evaluations of character; hence, humaneness is often associated with beauty (mei 
美).46 
Both literary knowledge and ritualistic know-how are necessary for authentic, sustainable 
delight. However, they are not sufficient for the “ultimate perfection or supreme realization of 
the human personality.”47 Perfecting or completion (cheng 成) requires music. In what sense does 
music complete the process of cultivation, and how is music related to delight-like states?  
Several kinds of connection are possible. One, seen in the Xunzi, is a causal relationship 
between music and emotion. Certain tunes or notes induce particular emotions in listeners.48 In 
this account, music creates social harmony by inducing shared feelings among a community of 
listeners, somewhat like a national anthem. More generally, music (and ritual) can cultivate good 
(or bad) character,49  or instill virtues.50  Music is also associated with knowledge: one with 
mastery of music can comprehend a person’s character from a piece of music.51 Music also 
increases a subject’s capacity for emotional response, making a person more sensitive to the 
emotions of others.52 Music can thus produce delight in various ways: by inducing shared pro-
social feelings among listeners, by cultivating pleasant character and inviting admiration of it, by 
enhanced sensitivity to the delight of others, or simply through the sheer delight of listening to 
music—which caused Confucius to not know the taste of meat for three months.53 
Here, however, I focus on another linkage between complete personal cultivation, 
achieved through music, and delight-like states. This starts from “le 樂” (delight-like states) and 
“yue 樂” (music) sharing a single character. This approach understands the generation of delight 
(le樂) by direct analogy with the generation of music (yue樂). Exposure to music ensures the 
acquisition of concepts or the cultivation of inner states and experiences, which guide judgments 
instrumental to realizing delight-like states in everyday social interaction.  
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4.3   The Role of Music in Personal Cultivation  
In this account, “completed in music” means: through exposure to (good) music, certain 
properties of the music condition or shape the subject, altering her inner life. That is, qualities or 
properties of music become concepts or qualities that structure the subject’s practical and 
normative judgments. As a result, the concepts or experiences that guide evaluation and practical 
judgments in social life can reflect properties found in (good) music. These include: harmony, 
rhythm, novelty, balance, surprise, consummation or resolution, ease, comfort and so forth. Take 
rhythm as an example. Rhythm is not simply metronomic regularity, but is change managed or 
introduced alongside consistency or regularity. Rhythm also involves creating expectancy and 
then providing satisfaction or completion.54 Both of these features are simultaneously explicitly 
musical and concepts or intuitions around which action can be organized. Indeed, the 
Xingzimingchu 《性自命出》suggests that music is a model for understanding the mind, with 
musical phenomena used to explain mental life and conscious experience. 55  Analects 3:23 
illustrates the idea:  
Confucius, when talking with the Grand Music Master of Lu, said, “In my understanding of 
music, the piece should be begun in unison (xi翕). Afterwards, if it is pure (chun 純), clear 
(jiao皦) and without break (yi繹), it will be complete (cheng成).56 
In this passage, the desirable qualities that “complete” music can be understood as 
desirable inner states or qualities of experience, sensitivity to which marks “complete” personal 
cultivation. They are qualities or sensibilities that can direct action. Unison or accord (xi 翕)  
implies cohesion and mutual fit. Purity or simplicity (chun純), initially experienced towards a 
note or musical phrasing, informs an analogous action-guiding concept in experience: what is 
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striking, impactful, or poignant. Clarity or brightness (jiao皦), implies the quality of standing 
out, of a focal point around which other notes or musicians—or thoughts and people—can be 
arranged. Finally, being without a break or uninterrupted (yi繹) translates into the concept or 
experience of flow, momentum, or smooth transitions, which distinguish successful social 
interaction. In summary, immersion in music can thus come to structure inner life and guide 
practical judgment.57 
Qualities or experiences such as accord or completeness are intrinsically satisfying. They 
are the constitutive elements of delight-like states—the kind of qualitatively distinctive 
experiences discussed earlier. Thus, someone cultivated through music (as well as ritual and 
poetry) is disposed to act on the world under the guidance of this practical and normative 
framework, aiming to realize delight-like states more broadly. As discussed above, in the 
Confucian context, this means realizing them in social contexts, through interaction with people. 
This is a task for the junzi, an expression of their power or potency (de 德). Mencius 5B1 
illustrates the point: harmonious music and social influence merge in the description of 
Confucius as the “perfect ensemble” or “complete concert” (jidacheng 集大成). This passage 
describes how historical figures approached the task of leading the people, with Confucius as the 
supreme exemplar: 
With Confucius there was the perfect ensemble. The perfect ensemble begins with 
the sound of the bronze bell and ends with the sound of the jade chimes, the bronze 
bell anticipating the harmony at the beginning of the concert, and the jade chimes 
bringing the harmony to a conclusion at its close. The harmony at the opening is the 
work of wisdom; the harmony at the close is the work of sageliness. Wisdom is like 
skill (qiao巧) and sageliness is like strength (li力)…58 
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Here, the fullest “completion” of social harmony is described musically, and it requires skill and 
practical wisdom. This suggests a second connection between music and delight like states. The 
first, as noted, was that music sensitizes a subject to experience the world in a certain way and to 
seek to replicate the delight-like states of musical experience in social interaction. In addition, 
the skills and habits acquired through musical training are needed realize this goal. Some these 
can be described as follows. 
One quality is attentiveness. The production of music requires training attention on 
fellow musicians. At a minimum, this means keeping time; and when less structured 
performances deviate from a score or key attention to fellow musicians is necessary to ensure the 
above-noted qualities of harmony, flow, and so on. In the creation of delight, attention means 
observing reactions and what pleases or delights. The Analects lauds the keen observation of 
conduct and personal demeanor, and learning through comparisons with those close at hand.59 
Related to attention is deference, or a considerateness towards others, by not dominating a 
performance by playing with too loudly or vigorously. Xunzi notes, “Music…is something one 
uses to practice courteous deference and yielding at home.”60 Not obstructing or inhibiting the 
contributions of others, while expressing positive interpersonal sentiments through deferential 
acts are prominent in the Analects, alongside avoiding competition and contentiousness.61 
As Nicholas Geir notes, imagination is required in the space between the fixed written 
score and its “translation” into a performance of it.62 In conduct too, space appears between 
customary norms or rules and actions fitted to particular circumstances. One function of the 
imagination, timing (shi 時) is both a musical term and a quality of Confucian exemplars:63 
making appropriate contributions at the right moment. This includes heightening enjoyment by 
delaying notes, using silences, and controlling narrative to build towards a climax. Such skills 
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translate into the creation of delight-like states in social interaction, through humor, timely 
interventions in conversations, avoiding inopportune moments, and so on. 
Musical performance and composition involve experimentation or improvisation, partly 
through trial and error, to arrive at a fitting blend of inputs or contributions.64  Under such 
conditions, action proceeds tentatively, without a settled goal; actions performed or notes played 
do themselves often suggest a way forward, though the subject remains ready to respond to other 
actions or notes. Experimentation can also involve taking the initiative, possibly to draw out 
contributions from others that would otherwise not be forthcoming; indeed, some argue that risk-
taking and showmanship are integral to musical performance.65 Various other personal qualities 
might be explored, but this sketch illustrates how the skills and dispositions acquired through 
music can be employed in social interaction to create delight.  
In summary, exposure to music provides key sensitivities and concepts, which guide 
judgment. As argued earlier, such capabilities are then applied to everyday social interactions; 
the aim is to generate delight-like states. This is an idealized account of conduct, an ethics.66 This 
approach honors the extensive concern with music and delight-like states in the early Confucian 
texts, as well as the commitment to well-conducted relationships, in family and in everyday 
social encounters. Analects 11:26 captures the spirit of this approach, if not the details, 
encapsulated in Confucius’ admiration for Zengxi’s account of the ideal life:  
[I]n the company of five or six young men and six or seven children, to cleanse ourselves 
in the Yi River, to revel in the cool breezes at the Altar for Rain, and then to return home 
singing.67 
V. ASSESSING AN ETHICS GROUNDED IN SHARED DELIGHT 
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Treating the shared experience of delight-like states as a practical ideal suggests a novel 
conception of the Confucian ideal of harmony. This involves the coordination of all the elements 
of a social interaction and event, so as to produce delight-like states among participants. 68 As the 
poet uses words to bring about certain aesthetic experiences in the audience, so the junzi uses a 
wider range of skills to coordinate participants and generate delight in social interaction. This is a 
substantial ethical task since, unlike naturally-arising pleasures, delight-like states are complex, 
the product of practical excellence, and must sometimes be created from scratch.69 In this way, 
exemplary persons “establish others in order to establish themselves.”70 
Admittedly, delight is not a simple good in the texts. Good and bad types of pleasure or 
delight are distinguished.71 However, delight still constitutes the basis for one form of idealized 
Confucian conduct, since the account presented is of a particular higher-order conception of “le
樂 ,” which contrasts with the indulgences and crude pleasures of ‘bad’ delight. Also, the 
capacity to generate delight-like states is also only one aspect of charismatic power or potency, 
alongside effects such as inspiring loyalty,72 and inducing shame.73 But my aim here is to explore 
a novel conception of ethical action, which extrapolates a distinctive concept-cluster in early 
Confucian thought. It is not the only conception of ethics present in the texts; what matters is that 
it coheres with or informs key Confucian values, such as ritualized conduct, humaneness, 
commitment to personal attachments, musicality and refinement (wen文).74 
In conclusion, it is worth considering the conception of the ethical that emerges when 
delight-like states are made the goal of conduct. Despite pleasure’s association with egoistic 
hedonism and hedonistic utilitarianism in ethics, the Confucian discourse on delight suggests a 
different ethical framework. This approach does not reduce to egoistic hedonism, since the 
delight created is inter-subjective or shared, the product of relational properties, rather than 
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aligning with a single person’s pleasure; its grounds are in the situation, and it partly coalesces 
around social norms and customary acts. In addition, it is an outcome of cultivated responses 
rather than a crude subjective feeling. Furthermore, the creation of delight carries a sense of 
obligation, not self-interest. While not necessarily experienced in the same way by all 
participants, all must have some share of delight; otherwise qualities such as accord, harmony, 
consummation and so on will be missing from participants experience, and the implicit task is 
not completed. This sense of duty reconciles the texts’ demands to abide by social norms and 
roles, which some ethicists find oppressive, with a less-scripted and more personal response to 
particulars that several defenders of Confucian ethics identify in the texts.75 Making delight an 
ethical task bridges these two interpretive approaches. 
Reading the texts through the phenomenon of delight-like states hints at new approaches 
in meta-ethics. Treating delight as a quality of social interaction is not consequentialist, since the 
basic unit of its creation is the social event or social interaction. These are self-contained, and 
approached serially as subjects move from one social interaction to another. Each is treated on its 
own merits and in isolation, rather than subjected to an aggregating calculation. 
Furthermore, focusing on the aesthetic experiences realized through shared social events 
shifts the locus of what makes an action right. It lies not in (virtuous) character or altruistic 
motivation per se, nor in reason-based justification of action, but rather in the quality of 
interaction attained, which is distinguished by qualities or features of experience. Yet this in turn 
is rooted in the practices and conventions of social life, and the discovery of which arrangements 
and responses can generate delight. As a result, moral knowledge is not a matter of certainty 
within the individual mind that is exercised as a moral judgment; the epistemology is more 
tentative and humble, arising through the attentive and sensitive treatment of particular social 
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encounters. Furthermore, since a human life can be understood to consist of multiple such social 
interactions and events, encountered on a serial basis in everyday life, so human flourishing 
consists in the sustained coordination of such interactions over a person’s lifetime. Instead of 
liberal individual’s prudential pursuit of personal projects, goals that define the self, this 
flourishing is built from the innumerable social interactions that make up each day across a 
single life. Not all interactions and ethical issues can be approached through this idealized 
framework; but perhaps a single paradigm of “ethics” is not necessary in order for people to act 
and live well. 
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